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Abstract
Neural networks are prone to misclassify slightly
modified input images. Recently, many defences
have been proposed, but none have improved the
robustness of neural networks consistently. Here,
we propose to use adversarial attacks as a function
evaluation to search for neural architectures that
can resist such attacks automatically. Experiments
on neural architecture search algorithms from the
literature show that although accurate, they are not
able to find robust architectures. A significant rea-
son for this lies in their limited search space. By
creating a novel neural architecture search with op-
tions for dense layers to connect with convolution
layers and vice-versa as well as the addition of con-
catenation layers in the search, we were able to
evolve an architecture that is inherently accurate on
adversarial samples. Interestingly, this inherent ro-
bustness of the evolved architecture rivals state-of-
the-art defences such as adversarial training while
being trained only on the non-adversarial samples.
Moreover, the evolved architecture makes use of
some peculiar traits which might be useful for de-
veloping even more robust ones. Thus, the results
here confirm that more robust architectures exist as
well as opens up a new realm of feasibilities for the
development and exploration of neural networks.
1 Introduction
Neural Architecture Search (NAS) and adversarial samples
have rarely appeared together. Regarding adversarial sam-
ples, they were discovered in 2013 when neural networks
were shown to behave strangely for nearly the same im-
ages [Szegedy, 2014]. Afterwards, a series of vulnerabili-
ties were found in [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Su et al.,
2019]. Such adversarial attacks can also be easily applied to
real-world scenarios which confer a big problem for current
deep neural networks’ applications. Currently, there is not
any known learning algorithm or procedure that can defend
against adversarial attacks consistently.
Regarding NAS, the automatic design of architectures has
been of broad interest for many years. The aim is to develop
methods that do not need specialists in order to be applied to
a different application. This would confer not only general-
ity but also easy of use. Most of the algorithms for NAS are
either based on reinforcement learning [Pham et al., 2018;
Zoph et al., 2018] or evolutionary computation [Real et al.,
2017; Miikkulainen et al., 2019]. On the one hand, in re-
inforcement learning approaches, architectures are created
from a sequence of actions which are afterwards rewarded
proportionally to the crafted architecture’s accuracy. On
the other hand, in evolutionary computation based methods,
small changes in the architecture (mutations) and recombi-
nations (crossover) are used to create new architectures. All
architectures evolved are evaluated based on their accuracy.
Some of the best architectures based on this accuracy are cho-
sen to continue to the next generation.
Here we propose the use of NAS to tackle the robustness
issues exposed by adversarial samples. In other words, ar-
chitecture search will be employed not only to find accurate
neural networks but also robust ones. This is based on the
principle that robustness of neural networks can be assessed
by using accuracy on adversarial samples as an evaluation
function. We hypothesise that if there is a solution in a given
architecture search space, the search algorithm would be able
to find it. This is not only a blind search for a cure. The best
architectures found should also hint which structures and pro-
cedures provide robustness for neural networks. Therefore, it
would be possible to use the results of the search to under-
stand further how to improve the representation of models as
well as design yet more robust ones.
2 Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning is a constrained optimisation
problem. Let f(x) ∈ [[1..N ]] be the output of a machine
learning algorithm in multi-label classification setting. Here,
x ∈ Rk is the input of the algorithm for the input of size k
and N is the number of classes in which x can be classified.
In Image Classification problem k = m×n×3 where m×n
is the the size of the image. Adversarial samples x′ can be
thus defined as follows:
x′ = x+ x such that f(x′) 6= f(x) (1)
in which x ∈ Rk is a small perturbation added to the input.
Therefore, adversarial machine learning can be defined as an
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optimization problem1:
minimize
x
g(x+ x)c subject to ‖x‖ ≤ th (2)
where th is a pre-defined threshold value and g()c is the soft-
label or confidence for the correct class c such that f(x) =
argmax g(x)
Moreover, attacks can be divided according to the func-
tion optimised. In this way, there are L0 (limited number of
pixels attacked), L1, L2 and L∞ (limited amount of varia-
tion in each pixel) types of attacks. There are many types
of attacks as well as their improvements. Universal per-
turbation types of attacks were shown possible in which a
single perturbation added to most of the samples is capable
of fooling a neural network in most of the cases [Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2017]. Moreover, extreme attacks such as
only modifying one pixel (L0 = 1) called one-pixel attack
is also shown to be surprisingly effective [Su et al., 2019;
Vargas and Kotyan, 2019]. Most of these attacks canbe eas-
ily transferred to real scenarios by using printed out versions
of them [Kurakin et al., 2016]. Moreover, carefully crafted
glasses [Sharif et al., 2016] or even general 3D adversarial
objects are also capable of causing misclassification [Atha-
lye and Sutskever, 2018]. Regarding understanding the phe-
nomenon, it is argued in [Goodfellow et al., 2014] that neural
networks’ linearity is one of the main reasons. Another re-
cent investigation proposes the conflicting saliency added by
adversarial samples as the reason for misclassification [Var-
gas and Su, 2019].
Many defensive systems were proposed to mitigate some
of the problems. However, current solutions are still far
from solving the problems. Defensive distillation [Paper-
not et al., 2016] uses a smaller neural network to learn the
content from the original one; however, it was shown not to
be robust enough [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. The addition
of adversarial samples to the training dataset, called adver-
sarial training, was also proposed [Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Huang et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018]. However, adversar-
ial training has a strong bias in the type of adversarial sam-
ples used and is still vulnerable to attacks Many recent varia-
tions of defences were proposed which are carefully analysed,
and many of their shortcomings explained in [Athalye et al.,
2018; Uesato et al., 2018]. In this article, different from pre-
vious approaches, we aim to tackle the robustness problems
of neural networks by automatically searching for inherent
robust architectures.
3 Neural Architecture Search
There are three components to a neural architecture search:
search space, search strategy and performance estimation. A
search space substantially limits the representation of the ar-
chitecture in a given space. A search strategy must be em-
ployed to search for architectures in a defined search space.
Some widely used search strategies for NAS are: Random
Search, Bayesian Optimization, Evolutionary Methods, Re-
inforcement Learning, and Gradient Based Methods. Finally,
1Here the definition will only concern untargeted attacks but a
similar optimization problem can be defined for targeted attacks
a performance estimation (usually error rate) is required to
evaluate the explored architectures.
Currently, most of the current NAS suffer from high com-
putational cost while searching in a relatively small search
space [Lee et al., 2018; Lima and Pozo, 2019].It is already
shown in [Yu and Kim, 2018] that, if there is a possibility of
fitness approximation at small search spaces, we could evolve
algorithms in an ample search space. Moreover, many ar-
chitecture searches focus primarily on the hyper-parameter
search while using architecture search spaces around previ-
ously hand-crafted architecture [Lee et al., 2018; He et al.,
2019] such as DenseNet which are proved to be vulnerable to
adversarial attacks [Vargas and Kotyan, 2019]. Therefore, for
finding robust architectures, it is crucial to expand the search
space beyond the current NAS.
SMASH [Brock et al., 2017] uses a neural network to gen-
erate the weights of the primary model. The main strength
of this approach lies in preventing high computational cost,
which is incurred in other searches. However, this comes at
the cost of not being able of tweaking hyperparameters which
affect weights like initialisers and regularisers. Deep Archi-
tect [Negrinho and Gordon, 2017] follows a hierarchical ap-
proach using various search algorithms such as Monte Carlo
Tree Search (MCTS) and Sequential Model based Global Op-
timization (SMBO).
4 Searching for Robust Architectures
A robust evaluation (defined in Section 4.1) and search algo-
rithm must be defined to search for robust architectures. The
search algorithm may be a NAS provided that some modifi-
cations are made (Section 4.2). However, to allow for a more
extensive search space, which is better suited to the problem,
we also propose the Robust Architecture Search (Section 5).
4.1 Robustness Evaluation
Adversarial accuracy may seem like a natural evaluation
function for assessing neural networks’ robustness. However,
there are many types of perturbations possible; each will re-
sult in a different type of robustness assessment and evolu-
tion. For example, let us suppose an evaluation with th = 5
is chosen, robust networks against th = 5 might be devel-
oped. At the same time, nothing can be said for other th and
attack types (different L). Therefore, th plays a role but the
different types of L0, L1, L2 and L∞ completely change the
type of robustness, such as wide perturbations (L∞), punc-
tual perturbations (L0) and a mix of both (L1 and L2). To
avoid creating neural networks that are only robust against
one type of robustness and at the same time to allow robust-
ness to slowly build-up from any partial robustness, a set of
adversarial attacks for varying th and L are necessary.
To evaluate the robustness of architectures in varying th
and Lwhile at the same time keeping computational cost low,
we use here a transferable type of attack. In other words, ad-
versarial samples previously found by attacking other meth-
ods are stored and used as possible adversarial samples to the
current model under evaluation. This solves the problem that
most of the attacks are usually slow to be put inside a loop
which can make the search for architectures too expensive.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed RAS structure with three subpopulations.
Model Attack Optimiser L0 Attack L∞ Attack Total
th = 1 th = 3 th = 5 th = 10 th = 1 th = 3 th = 5 th = 10
CapsNet DE 18 46 45 47 05 09 12 24 206CMA-ES 14 34 45 62 09 38 74 98 374
ResNet DE 23 66 75 77 06 22 46 78 393CMA-ES 11 49 63 77 28 72 75 83 458
AT DE 23 59 63 66 00 02 03 06 222CMA-ES 20 50 70 82 03 12 25 57 319
FS DE 21 73 78 78 04 21 45 78 398CMA-ES 17 49 69 78 26 63 66 74 442
Total 147 426 508 567 81 239 346 498 2812
Table 1: The number of samples used from each type of black-box attack to compose the 2812 adversarial samples. Based on the principle
of the transferability of adversarial samples, these adversarial samples are used as a fast attack for the robustness evaluation of architectures.
Details of the attacks as well as the motivation for using a model-agnostic (black-box) dual quality (L0 and L∞) assessment are explained in
detail at [Vargas and Kotyan, 2019].
Table 1 shows a summary of the number of images used
from each type of attack, totalling 2812 adversarial samples.
Samples were generated using the model agnostic dual qual-
ity assessment [Vargas and Kotyan, 2019]. Specifically, we
use the adversarial samples from two types of attacks (L0 and
L∞ attacks) with two optimization algorithms (Covariance
Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES) [Hansen et
al., 2003] and Differential Evolution (DE) [Storn and Price,
1997]). We use CIFAR-10 dataset [Krizhevsky et al., 2009]
to generate the adversarial samples. We attacked traditional
architectures such as ResNet [He et al., 2016] and CapsNet
[Sabour et al., 2017]. We also attacked some state-of-art-
defences such as Adversarial Training (AT) [Madry et al.,
2018] and Feature Squeezing (FS) [Xu et al., 2017] defending
ResNet. The evaluation procedure consists of calculating the
amount of successful adversarial samples divided by the total
of possible adversarial samples. This also avoids problems
with different amount of perturbation necessary for attacks to
succeed, which could cause incomparable results.
4.2 Robust Search Conversion of existing NAS
By changing the fitness function (in the case of evolution-
ary computation based NAS) or the reward function (in the
case of reinforcement learning based NAS), it is possible to
create robust search versions of NAS algorithms. In other
words, it is possible to convert the search for accuracy into
the search for robustness and accuracy. Here we use SMASH
and DeepArchitect for the tests. The reason for the choice
lies in the difference between the methods and availability of
the code. Both methods have their evaluation function modi-
fied to contain not only accuracy but also robustness (Section
4.1).
5 Robust Architecture Search (RAS)
Here, we propose an evolutionary algorithm to search for ro-
bust architectures called Robust Architecture Search (RAS)2.
It makes sense to focus here on search spaces that allow for
unusual layer types and their combinations to happen, which
is more vast than the current traditional search spaces. The
motivation to consider this vast search space is that some
of the most robust architectures might contain these unusual
combinations which are not yet found or deeply explored.
RAS Overview RAS works by creating three initial popu-
lations (layer, block and model populations). Every genera-
tion, the model population have each of its members modified
five times by mutations. The modified members are added to
the population as new members. Here we propose a utility
evaluation in which layer and block populations are evaluated
by the number of models (architectures) using them. Models
are evaluated by their accuracy and attack resilience (accu-
racy on adversarial samples). All blocks and layers which are
not used by any of the current members of the model popu-
lation are removed at the end step of each generation. More-
2Code is available at http://bit.ly/RobustArchitectureSearch
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Figure 2: Illustration of the proposed Evolutionary Strategy. In this strategy, Step 2, 3, and 4 are repeated for all the individuals in the child
population. Step 1 is repeated when all the individuals in the child population have been evaluated against a cluster individual.
over, architectures compete with similar ones in their sub-
population, such that only the fittest of each subpopulation
survives.
5.1 Description of Population
For such a vast search space to be more efficiently searched,
we propose to use three subpopulations, allowing for the
reuse of blocks and layers. Specifically, the layers consist of:
Layer Population: Raw layers (convolutional and fully con-
nected) which make up the blocks. Block Population: Blocks
which are a combination of layers. Model Population: A
population of architectures which consists of interconnected
blocks. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture.
The initial population consists of 25 random architectures
which contain U(2, 5) blocks made up of U(2, 5) layers, in
which U(a, b) is a uniform random distribution with mini-
mum a and maximum b values. The possible available pa-
rameters for the layers are as follows: for convolutional lay-
ers, filter size might be 8, 16, 32 or 64, stride size may be 1
or 2 and kernel size is either 1, 3 or 5; for fully connected
layers, the unit size may assume the values of 64, 128, 256
or 512. All the layers use Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) as an
activation function and are followed by a batch-normalisation
layer.
5.2 Mutation Operators
Regarding the mutation operators used to evolve the architec-
ture, they can be divided into layer, block and model muta-
tions which can only be applied to the respective layer, block
and model populations’ individuals. The following para-
graphs define the possible mutations.
Layer Mutation Layer mutations are of the following
types: a) Change Kernel: Changes the kernel size of the con-
volution layer, b) Change Filter: Changes the filter size of
the convolution layer, c) Change Units: Changes the unit size
of the fully connected layer, d) Swap Layer: Chosen layer is
swapped with a random layer from the layer population.
Block Mutation Block mutation change a single block in
the block population. The possibilities are: e) Add Layer: A
random layer is added to a chosen random block, f) Remove
Layer: A random layer is removed from a chosen random
block, g) Add Layer Connection: A random connection be-
tween two layers from the chosen random block is added, h)
Remove Layer Connection: A random connection between
the two layers from the chosen random block is removed, i)
Swap Block: Chosen block is swapped with a random block
from the population.
Model Mutation Model mutation modify a given architec-
ture. The possible model mutations are: j) Add Block: A ran-
dom block is added to the model, k) Remove Block: A random
block is removed from the model, l) Add Block connection: A
random connection between the two blocks is added, m) Re-
move Block connection: A random connection between the
two blocks is removed.
All mutations add a new member to the population instead
of substituting the previous one. In this manner, if nothing
is done, the population of layers and blocks may explode, in-
creasing the number of lesser quality layers and blocks. This
would cause the probability of choosing functional layers and
blocks to decrease. To avoid this, when the layer or block
population exceeds 100 individuals, the only layer/block mu-
tation available is swap layers/blocks.
5.3 Objective (Fitness) Function
Fitness of an individual of the model population is measured
using the final validation accuracy of the model after training
for a maximum of 200 epochs with early stopping if accu-
racy or validation accuracy do not change more than 0.001 in
the span of 15 epochs. Regarding the fitness calculation, the
fitness is calculated as the accuracy of the model plus the ro-
bustness of the model (Fitness = Accuracy+ Robustness).
The Accuracy of the architecture is calculated after the
model is trained for 50 epochs over the whole set of sam-
ples (50000 samples) of the CIFAR-10’s training dataset for
every 10 generation(s) or over 1000 random samples of the
CIFAR-10 training dataset for all other generations. This al-
lows an efficient evolution to happen in which blocks and lay-
ers evolve at a faster rate without interfering with the archi-
tecture’s accuracy. Using entire dataset subjects to evolving
the architecture to have better accuracy and using a subset of
the dataset evolves the layers and blocks of the architecture at
a faster rate. The Robustness of the architecture is calculated
using accuracy on adversarial samples as described in Section
4.1.
5.4 Spectrum-based Niching Scheme
To keep a high amount of diversity while searching in a vast
search space by using a novel algorithm described below also
shown in Figure 2. This niching scheme uses the idea of
Spectrum-based niching from [Vargas and Murata, 2017] but
explores a different approach to it. First, all the initial pop-
ulation is converted into a cluster population such that each
individual in the initial population is a cluster representative.
Then we create two child individuals for each cluster rep-
resentative by randomly applying five mutation operators on
cluster representative. We then find the closest cluster rep-
resentative to the child individual using spectrum described
below. If the fitness of the child individual is better than
the closest cluster representative than the child individual be-
comes the new cluster representative, and the old cluster rep-
resentative is removed from the population and the genera-
tion. The process is completed for all the individuals in a
cluster population. We are hence evolving a generation of the
evolution.
Here, we use the spectrum as a histogram containing the
features: Number of Blocks, Number of Total Layers, Num-
ber of Block Connections, Number of Total Layer Connec-
tions, Number of Dense Layers, Number of Convolution Lay-
ers, Number of Dense to Dense Connections, Number of
Dense to Convolution Connections, Number of Convolution
to Dense Connections, and Number of Convolution to Con-
volution Connections. By using this Spectrum-based niching
scheme, we aim to achieve an open-ended evolution, prevent-
ing the evolution from converging to a single robust architec-
ture. Preserving diversity in the population ensures that the
exploration rate remains relatively high, allowing us to find
different architectures even after many evolution steps. For
the vast search space of architectures, this property is espe-
cially important, allowing the algorithm to traverse the vast
search space efficiently.
6 Experiments on RAS and Converted NAS
Architecture Search Testing ER ER on Adversarial Samples
DeepArchitect* 25% 75%
SMASH* 23% 82%
Ours 18% 42%
Table 2: Error Rate (ER) on both the testing dataset and adversar-
ial samples when the evaluation function has both accuracies on the
testing data and accuracy on the adversarial samples.
*Both DeepArchitect and SMASH had their evaluation function
modified to be the sum of accuracy on the testing and adversarial
samples.
Here, experiments are conducted on both the proposed
RAS and converted versions of DeepArchitect and SMASH.
The objective is to achieve the highest robustness possible
using different types of architecture search algorithms and
compare their result and effectiveness. Initially, DeepArchi-
tect and Smash found architectures which had an error rate
of 11% and 4% respectively when the fitness is only based
on the neural network’s testing accuracy. However, when the
accuracy on adversarial samples is included in the evaluation
function, the final error rate increases to 25% and 23% re-
spectively (Table 2). This may also indicate that poisoning
the dataset might cause a substantial decrease in accuracy for
the architectures found by SMASH and DeepArchitect. In
the case of RAS, even with a more extensive search space, an
error rate of 18% is achieved.
Regarding the robustness of the architectures found, Table
2 shows that the final architecture found by DeepArchitect
and SMASH were very susceptible to attacks, with error rate
on adversarial samples of 75% and 82% respectively. De-
spite the inclusion of the R (measured accuracy on adver-
sarial samples) on the evaluation function, the architectures
were still unable to find a robust architecture. This might be
a consequence of the relatively small search space used and
more focused initialisation procedures. Moreover, the pro-
posed method (RAS) finds an architecture which has an error
rate of only 42% on adversarial samples. Note, however,
that in the case of the evolved architecture, this is an inher-
ent property of the architecture found. The architecture is
inherently robust without any kind of specialised training or
defence such as adversarial training (i.e., the architecture was
only trained on the training dataset). The addition of defences
should increase its robustness further.
7 Analyzing RAS
In this section, we will evaluate the proposed architecture re-
garding its evolution quality and how subpopulations behave
throughout the process. Figure 3 shows how the mean accu-
racy of the architectures evolved increases over time. The pat-
tern of behaviour is typical of evolutionary algorithms, show-
ing that evolution is happening as expected.
In Figure 4, the overall characteristics of the evolved archi-
tectures throughout the generations are shown. The average
number of blocks and the connections between them increase
over the generations. However, the average number of layers
never reaches the same complexity as the initial models. The
number of layers decreases steeply initially while slowly in-
creasing afterwards. Therefore, the overall behaviour is that
blocks become smaller and numerous. A consequence of this
is that the number of connections becomes proportional to the
number of connections between blocks and therefore exhibit
similar behaviour. The average number of layers per block
and the average number of connections shows little change,
varying only 0.5 and 0.16 respectively.
Notice that the average number of layers increases but the
average number of layers per block continues to decrease al-
beit slowly. Consequently, blocks tend to degenerate into a
few layers, resulting in around three layers per block from
the first average number of 3.2 layers per block. Lastly, the
average number of connections in a block is kept more or less
the same, with the mean varying throughout only from 2.1
Figure 3: Accuracy improvement over the generations.
Figure 4: The overall distribution of the architectures found in each generation. The connections from the input layer and the softmax layer
are always present and, therefore, they are omitted in the calculation.
to 2.26. The behaviour described above might suggest that it
is hard to create big reusable blocks. This seems to be sup-
ported by both the decrease of complexity observed as well
as the increase in the number of blocks.
8 Analyzing the Final Architecture:
Searching for the Key to Inherent
Robustness
RAS found an architecture that possesses inherent robustness
capable of rivalling current defences. To investigate the rea-
son behind this robustness, we can take a more in-depth look
at the architecture found. Figure 5 show(s) some peculiari-
ties from the evolved architecture: multiple bottlenecks, pro-
jections into high-dimensional space and paths with different
constraints.
Multiple Bottlenecks and Projections into High-
Dimensional Space The first peculiarity is the use of
Dense layers in-between Convolutional ones. This might
seem like a bottleneck similar to the ones used in variational
autoencoders. However, it is the opposite of a bottleneck
(Figure 5); it is a projection in high-dimensional space. The
evolved architecture uses mostly a low number of filters
while, in some parts of it, high-dimensional projections exist.
In the whole architecture, four Dense layers in-between
Convolutional ones were used, and all of the projects into
higher dimensional space. This follows directly from Cover’s
Theorem which states that projecting into high dimensional
space makes a training set linearly separable [Cover, 1965].
Paths with Different Constraints The second peculiarity
is the use of multiple paths with the different number of fil-
ters and output sizes after high-dimensional projections. No-
tice how the number of filters differs in each of the Convo-
lutional layers in these paths. This means there are different
constraints over the learning in each of these paths, which
should foster different types of features. Therefore, this is
a multi-bottleneck structure forcing the learning of different
sets of features which are now easily constructed from the
previous high-dimensional projection.
9 Conclusions
Automatic search for robust architectures is proposed as a
paradigm for developing and researching robust models. This
paradigm is based on using adversarial attacks together with
error rate as evaluation functions in NAS. Experiments on us-
ing this paradigm with some of the current NAS had poor
results. This was justified by the small search space used
by current methods. Here, we propose the RAS method,
which has a broader search space, including concatenation,
Figure 5: Two fragments of the evolved architecture which has peculiar traits.
connections between dense to convolutional layer and vice-
versa. Results with RAS showed that inherently robust ar-
chitectures do indeed exist. In fact, the evolved architecture
achieved robust results comparable with state-of-the-art de-
fences while not having any specialised training or defence.
In other words, the evolved architecture is inherently robust.
Such inherent robustness could increase if adversarial train-
ing, or other types of defence, or a combination of them are
employed together with it.
Moreover, investigating the reasons behind such robustness
have shown that some peculiar traits are present. The evolved
architecture has overall a low number of filters and many bot-
tlenecks. Multiple projections into high-dimensional space
are also present to possibly facilitate the separation of features
(Cover’s Theorem). It also uses multiple paths with differ-
ent constraints after the high-dimensional projection, which
should, consequently, cause a diverse set of features to be
learned by the network. Thus, in the search space of neural
networks, more robust architectures do exist, and more re-
search is required to find and fully document them as well as
their features.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by JST, ACT-I Grant Number JP-
50243 and JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP20241216. Ad-
ditionally, we would like to thank Prof. Junichi Murata for the
kind support without which it would not be possible to con-
duct this research.
References
[Athalye and Sutskever, 2018] Anish Athalye and Ilya
Sutskever. Synthesizing robust adversarial examples. In
Icml, 2018.
[Athalye et al., 2018] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and
David Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of
security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples.
In Icml, 2018.
[Brock et al., 2017] Andrew Brock, Theodore Lim, James M
Ritchie, and Nick Weston. Smash: one-shot model ar-
chitecture search through hypernetworks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.05344, 2017.
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017] Nicholas Carlini and David
Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), pages 39–57. Ieee, 2017.
[Cover, 1965] Thomas M Cover. Geometrical and statistical
properties of systems of linear inequalities with applica-
tions in pattern recognition. IEEE transactions on elec-
tronic computers, (3):326–334, 1965.
[Goodfellow et al., 2014] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon
Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572,
2014.
[Hansen et al., 2003] Nikolaus Hansen, Sibylle D Mu¨ller,
and Petros Koumoutsakos. Reducing the time complex-
ity of the derandomized evolution strategy with covariance
matrix adaptation (cma-es). Evolutionary computation,
11(1):1–18, 2003.
[He et al., 2016] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing
Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image recog-
nition. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition, pages 770–778, 2016.
[He et al., 2019] Xin He, Kaiyong Zhao, and Xiaowen Chu.
Automl: A survey of the state-of-the-art. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1908.00709, 2019.
[Huang et al., 2015] Ruitong Huang, Bing Xu, Dale Schuur-
mans, and Csaba Szepesva´ri. Learning with a strong ad-
versary. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.03034, 2015.
[Krizhevsky et al., 2009] Alex Krizhevsky, Geoffrey Hinton,
et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny im-
ages. Technical report, 2009.
[Kurakin et al., 2016] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and
Samy Bengio. Adversarial examples in the physical world.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[Lee et al., 2018] Hyeon-Chang Lee, Dong-Pil Yu, and
Yong-Hyuk Kim. On the hardness of parameter optimiza-
tion of convolution neural networks using genetic algo-
rithm and machine learning. In Proceedings of the Ge-
netic and Evolutionary Computation Conference Compan-
ion, pages 51–52, 2018.
[Lima and Pozo, 2019] Ricardo HR Lima and Aurora TR
Pozo. Evolving convolutional neural networks through
grammatical evolution. In Proceedings of the Genetic and
Evolutionary Computation Conference Companion, pages
179–180, 2019.
[Madry et al., 2018] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar
Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and
Adrian Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to
adversarial attacks. In Iclr, 2018.
[Miikkulainen et al., 2019] Risto Miikkulainen, Jason
Liang, Elliot Meyerson, Aditya Rawal, Daniel Fink,
Olivier Francon, Bala Raju, Hormoz Shahrzad, Arshak
Navruzyan, Nigel Duffy, et al. Evolving deep neural
networks. In Artificial Intelligence in the Age of Neural
Networks and Brain Computing, pages 293–312. Elsevier,
2019.
[Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-
Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Omar Fawzi, and Pascal
Frossard. Universal adversarial perturbations. In 2017
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), pages 86–94. Ieee, 2017.
[Negrinho and Gordon, 2017] Renato Negrinho and Ge-
off Gordon. Deeparchitect: Automatically design-
ing and training deep architectures. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.08792, 2017.
[Papernot et al., 2016] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel,
Xi Wu, Somesh Jha, and Ananthram Swami. Distillation
as a defense to adversarial perturbations against deep neu-
ral networks. In 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), pages 582–597. Ieee, 2016.
[Pham et al., 2018] Hieu Pham, Melody Guan, Barret Zoph,
Quoc Le, and Jeff Dean. Efficient neural architecture
search via parameter sharing. In International Conference
on Machine Learning, pages 4092–4101, 2018.
[Real et al., 2017] Esteban Real, Sherry Moore, Andrew
Selle, Saurabh Saxena, Yutaka Leon Suematsu, Jie Tan,
Quoc V Le, and Alexey Kurakin. Large-scale evolution
of image classifiers. In Proceedings of the 34th Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning-Volume 70, pages
2902–2911. JMLR. org, 2017.
[Sabour et al., 2017] Sara Sabour, Nicholas Frosst, and Ge-
offrey E Hinton. Dynamic routing between capsules. In
Advances in neural information processing systems, pages
3856–3866, 2017.
[Sharif et al., 2016] Mahmood Sharif, Sruti Bhagavatula,
Lujo Bauer, and Michael K Reiter. Accessorize to a crime:
Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recogni-
tion. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 1528–
1540. Acm, 2016.
[Storn and Price, 1997] R. Storn and K. Price. Differential
evolution–a simple and efficient heuristic for global opti-
mization over continuous spaces. Journal of global opti-
mization, 11(4):341–359, 1997.
[Su et al., 2019] Jiawei Su, Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas, and
Kouichi Sakurai. One pixel attack for fooling deep neural
networks. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computa-
tion, 23(5):828–841, 2019.
[Szegedy, 2014] Christian et al. Szegedy. Intriguing proper-
ties of neural networks. In In ICLR. Citeseer, 2014.
[Uesato et al., 2018] Jonathan Uesato, Brendan
O’Donoghue, Pushmeet Kohli, and Aaron Oord. Ad-
versarial risk and the dangers of evaluating against
weak attacks. In International Conference on Machine
Learning, pages 5032–5041, 2018.
[Vargas and Kotyan, 2019] Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas and
Shashank Kotyan. Robustness assessment for adversar-
ial machine learning: Problems, solutions and a survey
of current neural networks and defenses. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1906.06026, 2019.
[Vargas and Murata, 2017] Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas and
Junichi Murata. Spectrum-diverse neuroevolution with
unified neural models. IEEE transactions on neural net-
works and learning systems, 28(8):1759–1773, 2017.
[Vargas and Su, 2019] Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas and Ji-
awei Su. Understanding the one-pixel attack: Prop-
agation maps and locality analysis. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1902.02947, 2019.
[Xu et al., 2017] Weilin Xu, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi.
Feature squeezing: Detecting adversarial examples in deep
neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.01155, 2017.
[Yu and Kim, 2018] Dong-Pil Yu and Yong-Hyuk Kim. Is it
worth to approximate fitness by machine learning? inves-
tigation on the extensibility according to problem size. In
Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation
Conference Companion, pages 77–78, 2018.
[Zoph et al., 2018] Barret Zoph, Vijay Vasudevan, Jonathon
Shlens, and Quoc V Le. Learning transferable architec-
tures for scalable image recognition. In Proceedings of the
IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recogni-
tion, pages 8697–8710, 2018.
